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Abstract 
The role of the board of directors and their composition is a matter that revolves around 
different contradictory views for the determination of the performance of the firms. There 
are several contrasting views that have emerged related to the size of the board and its 
effect on performance. One set of researchers’ state that larger board size will have 
diverse skill and knowledge which in turn will have a positive impact on the performance 
of the firm. The other group of researchers state that a larger board size will have a 
negative effect on performance due to reasons like lack of coordination, slow decision 
making process and free rider issues. The third group states that the relationship 
between the size of the board and the performance of the firm is in form of an inverted 
U shaped curve. While some other researchers find low significance or no link between 
the board size and the performance of the firm. The researcher has thus formed the first 
and the third hypothesis based on these contradictory views.  
Based on the contradictory opinions regarding the number of non-executive directors 
and their effect on performance of the firm the researcher has set the second 
hypothesis for this dissertation. There are three groups of researchers that study the 
effect of non-executive directors and their impact on the performance of the firm. One of 
them state that there is a positive impact on performance, the other state that there is a 
negative influence due to the outside directors and the third find no relation between the 
non-executive directors and the performance of the firms. This dissertation studies 
these issues, uses quantitative method to study the effect between variables, explains 
the vagueness in data obtained, discusses the findings and mentions the inferences 
and the implications formed out of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
1.1 Overview. 
The topic of this dissertation revolves around corporate governance in particular. The 
corporate governance system is related to processes, control and decision making in 
every level of the organisation. Mainly corporate governance is concerned with the 
manner in which the top managers or the board of directors manage and execute 
their responsibilities and how in turn are they accountable to the authority provided to 
them(Renzetti,1992). Regardless to any type of organisation i.e. either big or small, 
private or public, corporate governance is essential since it helps in avoiding the 
misuse of the power allocated to these top managers or the board of directors 
(Renzetti, 1992). Its main concern is the need of openness, integrity, reliability and 
the decision making process of the organisation. In short corporate governance 
could be called as an extra wing to business ethics. 
This dissertation aims at corporate governance and its mechanisms in particular. 
However the area of literature of corporate governance is so large that it is 
impossible for the researcher to cover every aspect. However the researcher has 
mentioned a gist of the different mechanisms of corporate governance that lead to 
the improvement of performance of companies. The researcher has summarized 
some of the mechanisms like the role of board of directors, the impact of the non-
executive directors, executive compensation, and managerial labour market and so 
on. These mechanisms in turn help to align the interest of the managers and the 
shareholders, thus solving the agency conflict (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). Also 
large number of corporate scams and debacles in recent times has laid a significant 
amount of importance on the issues of corporate governance for the health of the 
organisations and the society as a whole. The board of directors or the board of the 
company vests the power to control over the governance in an organisation. Also 
several studies have been carried out to alleviate the potential conflicts that arise 
between board of directors or managers and the shareholders (Agency problem). 
Few main mechanisms of corporate governance is the role of outside directors or the 
non- executive directors on the board, the managerial compensation and equity 
ownership in the hand of active outside investors (Gibbs, 1993). Keeping in mind the 
vastness of the availability of data in the above mentioned areas, it is beyond the 
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capacity of the researcher to explore aspect of the data in detail. However, for the 
purpose of this dissertation the researcher has mainly focused on board level 
literature and information pertaining to non-executive directors. 
1.2 Methodology 
For the purpose of this dissertation, a sample size of 40 FTSE 100 companies from 
different sectors is selected. These companies are listed on the London stock 
exchange. The annual reports of these companies for a two year period namely 
2006-07 and 2007-08 were utilized for the collection and comparison of data. A list of 
these companies has been given in Annexure 1. A multiple linear regression model 
is used to analyse the data collected. This quantitative method is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 3.  
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1.3 Board composition and Performance. 
The board of directors is a very significant part of the corporate governance 
literature. Keeping the dissertation topic in mind, the researcher as mentioned earlier 
has investigated the board level literature and information relating to the non-
executive directors. The structure of the board is one of the most arguable issues 
related to corporate governance in a firm. Thus it is essential to structure the board 
aptly, so as the mechanisms of corporate governance work to enhance the 
performance of the firm (Cheng,2008). There is a vast amount of existing literature 
related to the size of the board and its effect on performance. Some of these findings 
are contradictory among themselves and the researcher would like to list them in 
short. 
One group of researchers were of the view that a larger board size would improve 
the performance of a firm. This positive impact on performance was based on the 
fact that a larger board size would bring a larger source of knowledge and different 
expertise from different backgrounds to the board. Also if the board of directors have 
to monitor the management on behalf of the shareholders it would be right to say 
that the directors on the board should be from among one of them. (Weisbach, 1998; 
Hermalin and Weisbach ,1998). 
There were another set of contradicting views suggested by the study of other 
researchers that a larger board size has a negative impact on the performance of the 
company. This was based on the research that larger board size would weaken the 
decision making process, create problems of coordination, lead to time-consuming 
management processes and increase the free-riding problems. It would also lead to 
transfer of the control power in the hands of the CEO. All these factors will affect the 
performance of the company. (Yermack, 1996 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001). 
The third group of researchers through their study illustrate an inverted U shaped 
relationship between the board size and the performance of the company. They state 
if the size of the board extends beyond a particular optimum level, the performance 
of the firm would be negatively affected (Vafeas, 1999).These were some of the 
contrasting views related to the composition of the board. 
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1.4 Limitations in the existing literature. 
1.4.a The lack of consideration of certain aspects of board size and non-
executive directors and their effect on the performance of companies. 
The board consists of two main types of directors: executive directors and non  
executive directors. The first type of directors are full time executives of the firm 
along with being the members of the board. On the other hand the non-executive 
directors are a heterogeneous group and have different functions based on their 
expertise and knowledge.  
As mentioned earlier, the research on entire board size and performance was 
studied by many researchers. However these researchers did not take into account 
the effect of each type of director on the performance of the firm. The main drawback 
that makes it difficult to study the effect of each type of director is the differences in 
the composition of the board across various industries and also the absence of any 
theoretical model that states the optimum structure of the board (Young et al, 2005). 
Some researchers have taken into consideration the effect of a particular type of 
director without relating the total board composition to the performance as well. 
Similarly, some researchers studied the effect of non-executive directors on 
corporate performance without associating other factors like board size and board 
dynamics and so on. 
The aim of this dissertation is to study this gap in the literature and explore the role 
of non-executive director along with the total board size and its effect on corporate 
performance.  
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1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
This subsection explains the overall structure of the dissertation.  
The following section, Chapter 2 Literature review is a prologue to this study. It 
explains and covers the basic concept of corporate governance and literature 
relating to the mechanisms of corporate governance in general and the board level 
literature in detail. It provides an unbiased and comprehensive observation to the 
available literature related to our study. 
Chapter 3, Methodology illustrates the measures adopted in this dissertation and 
gives the justification for the implementation of these methods along with their 
limitations. 
Implementation of these methods in Chapter 3, leads us to Chapter 4 that deals with 
the findings and results for the study of our dissertation. This is followed by Chapter 
5, which analyses the findings obtained in the previous chapter in detail.  
Chapter 6,Conclusion, as the title suggests , here the researcher concludes the 
dissertation with conjectures, important insights and also states the limitations of the 
study and further scope of research in this field. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, the researcher has studied the effect of different types of directors and 
board composition as a whole on the performance of the company. Also the role of 
different types of directors is taken into consideration to enhance the significance of 
the results obtained in the study. The following chapter illustrates a detailed literature 
review related to this area of study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to summarize the basic concepts and role of 
corporate governance in general. For the purpose of study of the effect of different 
kinds of directors on the performance of the company, the researcher has explored 
the board level literature in particular. The researcher has explained different areas 
of the board like the board size, the ownership structure, and the background of the 
directors, all which affect the corporate performance. 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Further below, the basic concept of corporate governance, its role and its 
mechanisms are explained to have a clear understanding of different stages included 
in the dissertation. 
2.2.1 Basic concept of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is defined in several ways and can be interpreted using 
diverse set of approaches. Corporate governance can be described as a system that 
includes the policies, fulfils the needs of the shareholders, monitors and controls the 
management of a firm and brings objectivity and transparency in the business 
(Gibbs, 1993). Moreover, the signs of good corporate governance are dependent on 
external market and the culture existing in the firm. To ensure the smooth functioning 
of the organisation, it is the duty of the managers and the board to monitor the 
activities of the firm as a whole (Carpenter and Westphal , 2001).Thus the main aim 
of corporate governance is to control and monitor the working of the management in 
an organisation through mechanisms which ensure to reduce the principal-agent 
problem (Jensen and Meckling,1976).One common mechanism to solve this problem 
is to award the management in terms of stock for a specific level of performance. 
This in turn will help the management to work and show some vested interest to 
raise the prices of the stock. This safeguards the wealth of the shareholders and 
reduces the manager-stockholder dilemma since it aligns the interests of the 
management and the shareholders (Gibbs, 1993). Thus, corporate governance is an 
entire structure, which consists of controlling and monitoring in turn to achieve long 
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term success in company affairs pertaining to shareholders and stockholders of the 
company. It helps to comply with the legal and regulatory requirements and setting 
the rules for accurate decision making process within the organisation (Claessens et 
al, 2000).  
Corporate governance can also be viewed as the system by which the shareholders 
can monitor and implement control over the internal management in an organisation 
to protect their interests (John and Senbet, 1998). Due to the separation of 
ownership and control as explained earlier, the main subject of governance is to 
reduce the conflict of interests among the shareholders and the management.  In the 
absence of effective corporate governance system, the promises made by the top 
managers of the organisation are not credible to the shareholders. Thus in short, 
corporate governance includes how decisions are made in corporations, the 
influence of various stakeholders at every stage, the individual that is held 
accountable for the performance of the company and the standard of performance 
required (John and Senbet, 1998). There are several mechanisms of corporate 
governance that cater and deal with these problems. They are explained in the 
following section.  
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2.2.2 Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
The separation of stakeholders and the management is the primary reason for 
corporate governance and its mechanisms to exist. There are various other reasons 
due to which corporate governance has attained importance recently. It is not 
possible to include all the reasons that lead to the existence of governance however 
an example by Jensen (1989)states the existing corporate governance mechanisms 
have failed to perform in large US corporations which is one of the reasons why right 
corporate governance in these new markets are essential.  
Corporate governance mechanisms deal with the stakeholders of a corporation 
taking direct control over the professional managers, entrepreneurs and the inside 
management of an organisation, to protect their self-interests (John and Senbet, 
1998). There are internal as well as external mechanisms for corporate control. 
Various researchers have listed the different types of mechanisms of corporate 
governance in several ways. As per the article written by Jensen (1993) he lists the 
mechanisms for corporate governance in four ways: legal and regulatory 
mechanisms, internal mechanisms, external mechanisms and product market 
competition. Since the researcher in this dissertation focuses mainly on the effect of 
board composition on performance, we will primarily focus on internal mechanisms 
of corporate governance. These mechanisms include the board of directors and 
their fiduciary duties, executive compensation which aligns the interest of the 
managers along with the shareholders, ownership structure of compensation 
and the managerial labour market.  
These mechanisms are studied in the following sub-section.  
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2.2.2 a Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Governance. 
1) The role of board of directors 
Generally, due to the distribution of ownership of firms stock the shareholders do not 
take direct interest in controlling the management of any firm (Gibbs, 1993). This 
leads to poor performance of the company and the stock prices fall down. For this 
purpose, the board of directors are appointed to control and monitor the 
management of the organisation. Thus, it is the duty of the board of directors to keep 
an eye on the management on behalf of these small powerless investors (Denis, 
2001). The role and authority of the board of directors is to supervise, control, fire, 
compensate, hire or advice the top management for the benefit of the shareholders. 
Its in the hands of the board to make all the major decisions in terms of the future of 
the company or even the distribution of income or assets (Thomas, 1992).  Its 
mandatory by law for every US Corporation to appoint a board of directors (Denis, 
2001). The legal requirements differ from country to country, however every country 
has some terms and conditions to form a board of directors during the start up stage. 
To manage its role well, the board is divided into two major teams. This consists of 
the insider directors and the outside directors. The insider directors are also called 
as executive directors consist of the current managers of the top management. On 
the other hand, the outside directors, which are also called as non-executive 
directors, consist of professional individuals who scrutinize the top management 
(Fama, 1980).  
However, in practice it is not clear that the board has an incentive to monitor the top 
management on behalf of the shareholders. This leads to an agency cost problem 
due to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If a 
specified level of company stock is associated with top management as well, the 
interests of the management and the shareholders are aligned. The management 
will then work to increase the price of the stock, which in turn leads to the 
improvement in performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
In addition, another problem is the free rider issue among shareholders. Since an 
individual investor has very little holding in the company which is not sufficient to 
closely monitor and control the top management or the board, shareholders free ride 
on others to do this job (John and Senbet ,1998). Also according to Fama and 
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Jensen (1983) more the number of outside directors (Non-executive directors), 
greater is the efficiency in the monitoring and controlling of the board. It will also 
avoid the managers to be opportunistic and lessen the rise of agency problem. For 
example, supervision by outside directors can restrict self benefit managers to use 
the excess cash flow to diversify and increase unprofitable growth on the cost of the 
shareholders (Gibbs, 1993).  
According to Denis (2001), the management has a greater influence on the 
appointment and the working of the board. The management can influence the 
decision of firing the members of the board for their individual sympathetic needs. 
Since the management has the authority to stack the board for their interests at any 
time, most of the decisions by the board are an outcome of the influence of the 
management or the CEOs. Due to all these reasons, the strength of the board 
especially that of the outside directors and their decisions for the management on 
behalf of the shareholders is questionable (Herman, 1981). 
Various reforms have been set to overcome these problems due to public pressure. 
These reforms include, the reduction in size of the board for effective and quick 
decision making, increasing the number of non-executive directors, assigning the 
right to these outside directors to elect other directors for the board and to set 
executive compensations, separate the positions of chief executive officer (CEO) 
and the chairperson of the board and make it obligatory for every board member to 
own stock in the firm (Denis 2001). 
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2) Executive compensation 
Managerial compensation is another mechanism to solve the agency problem. The 
structure of pay  off of different types of stakeholders is different and hence the 
interest of each also differs, this leads to the principal- agent problem. Its the 
responsibility of the board to decide on the pay-offs of the top management. A 
manager will not risk a high paid job; however the interests should be aligned with 
that of the investors as well. Thus the level of compensation to the top managers is a 
highly arguable factor in corporate governance. 
Thus, according to right corporate governance, management should act in the best 
interest of the shareholders and maximize their wealth. A general recommendation is 
to reward the managers some specified level of stock for their performance (Denis, 
2001). If the wealth of the managers are closely linked with the wealth of the 
shareholders, the management will work to increase shareholder wealth. This aligns 
the interests of both the shareholders and the management, thus reducing the 
agency problem (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). However, ownership of company stocks 
by the management is not as straightforward as it sounds. The incentives of 
managerial holding of common stocks are inconsistent since there are differences in 
risk bearing capabilities by the top management and the investors (Denis, 2001). We 
are aware that the outside investor is capable of holding a diversified portfolio 
compared to the top management who have their personal wealth tied up to the 
capital of the firm. To decrease the level of unsystematic risk due to an undiversified 
firm, managerial ownership of common stocks gives the managers an incentive to 
diversify the firm to increase the value of their individual portfolios (Gibbs, 1993). In 
the case of the difference of the compensation from an optimal level, the outside 
directors will restrict the behaviour of the management (Singh, 1990). Thus, the 
outside directors help in aligning management compensation. 
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3) Ownership structure 
As mentioned earlier that the ownership of stocks are distributed in the hands of 
many shareholders. This however can differ in terms that the ownership of common 
stocks is concentrated. It is certain, that if small number of investors hold large sum 
of stocks of a firm it gives them a right to control and remove inefficiencies (Hill and 
Snell, 1989). However, the role of these investors is not clear. Many investors are 
ignorant and rather than playing an active role in monitoring the management aim on 
stock dumping. The roles of these outside investors are uncertain and vary across 
various companies (Jensen and Warner, 1988). Thus stock ownership is effective 
only if the stocks held are concentrated in a hand of few shareholders and also that 
the shareholders are active in monitoring the management of the firm. Also executive 
compensation, ownership structure and board composition are dependent on each 
other and vary on the type of firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mehran (1995) in his 
paper states his findings on ownership structure. One of his findings states that the 
compensation of managers is in the form of equity, if there are a higher percentage 
of outside directors appointed in the board. However, very little research has been 
done on the ownership structure of compensation. 
The literature about the ownership structure does not just revolve around the 
management or executive directors but also the non- executive owners (outside 
investors or blockholders). These outside investors who hold some significant 
proportion of equity stakes in the particular firm, have a right to monitor and influence 
the working in that particular firm.  The role played by these investors is very crucial 
for the success of governance mechanisms in a firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
These non- executive owners not only monitor to enhance the performance of the 
company but also the benefits of other investors (Holderness, 2001). As stated 
earlier this ownership of equity among outside investors has an impact on the 
actions of a firm. However the positive impact of these outside block holders is mixed 
since it depends on their activism. Lack of activism on behalf of the outside investors 
may lead to less monitoring and hence poor performance in the firm. In sum, non-
executive owners being active can alter a few actions in the firm but not necessarily 
enhance the performance (Romano, 2000). 
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4) Managerial Labour market 
Labour market is yet another mechanism used to discipline the management in the 
firm (Fama, 1980). Today all firms experience intense competition both in terms of 
internal and external pressure. The labour market gives more importance to the 
managers which work in the interest of the shareholders and enhance the 
performance of the company which in turn leads to the increase in share prices of 
the company. However, self centred managers are valued less and are threatened to 
lose their jobs. Also if the management of a firm is well established in the market, 
they can compensate themselves irrespective of their performance and thus holding 
their jobs. However this will have a lower value in the outside market.  
Also if the inefficiency of the management comes in the way of selling the products 
of the company as per the needs of the consumers and within the cost structure, it 
can create financial distress in the company. It can weaken the performance of the 
company and may also lead to bankruptcy, which in turn will mean a loss of 
investors. Thus market competition is one of the best mechanisms for good 
corporate governance (Jensen, 1993). 
In the next section, the benefits of good corporate governance are looked at. 
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2.2.3 Benefits of good corporate governance 
The impact of good corporate governance can be enumerated based on four major 
components: Ownership structure and influence, financial investors rights and 
relations, financial transparency and accountability and board structure and process 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
1) Ownership structure and influence: 
As stated earlier, it is observed that the holdings of common stock are dispersed 
among shareholders due to which they have very little interest in the monitoring of 
the firm and corporate governance is a mechanism through which their rights can be 
protected. Ownership structure helps the shareholders to monitor and influence the 
management which in turn aligns their interests and determines the transfer of 
wealth between the two parties (Gibbs, 1993).  This in turn helps to reduce or 
minimize the level of risk or fraud, since it presents a system by which, the 
shareholder can review the risk and assess the projects well. 
 
2) Financial Investors rights and relations: 
Corporate governance can help the shareholders to protect their rights against 
expropriation against the insider management of the firm (La Porta et al, 2000). The 
main reason why outside investors finance a firm is because their rights are 
protected within a firm that is regulated with good corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, sometimes the managers use the cash flow of the firm for 
their own personal benefit and take the investors for granted (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Good corporate governance enables the investors to safeguard their rights 
and have the power to change the directors, to force the payment of dividends and 
also to restrict a project if that benefits the insider management on the cost of 
outside investors (La Porta et al, 2000). This enables the investors to gain cash from 
the insider management. Thus, corporate governance reduces the risk perceived by 
shareholders by protecting their rights making it easy for firms to raise finance. 
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3) Financial transparency and accountability 
Financial transparency will ease and facilitate the monitoring actions of the 
management for the shareholders since it reduces the asymmetry in information 
between the firm and the investors. Managers will not act opportunistically since they 
will reveal timely information needed, and not withhold any adverse information . As 
a result, the firm will be looked as a low risk firm by the shareholders. Also it can 
enhance the performance of the firm due to clear accountability and can link reward 
to better performance, thus motivating the firm to perform even better (Demsetz, 
1983; Singh , 1990). 
 
4) Board structure and Process 
Corporate governance is inclusive of certain aspects like, the board structure dealing 
with things like, board size and composition in terms of the proportion of number of 
outside and inside directors, board leadership, how knowledgeable and experienced 
the board members are, the number of outside directors and their competency and 
the rewards linked with the performance for the long term success of the firm. These 
aspects highlight the ability of the board to provide independent understanding of the 
performance of the firm and the actions which are held liable for the protection of 
rights of the shareholders (Gibbs,1993). Also if a greater proportion of outside 
directors are included in the board the greater is the monitoring on the management 
of the firm. Thus the investors face less risk and the involvement of the outside 
directors help to provide unrestricted and political assurance towards the firm (Fama, 
1980). 
The following subdivision will look at some of these board characteristics and its 
effect on performance as a whole which is the main part of our study. This section 
will explain certain aspects necessary to understand the latter part of the dissertation 
and will look at board structure and process in detail. 
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2.3 Board Characteristics and its effect on corporate Performance 
2.3.1. Overview 
Recent high level corporate collapses, have suggested the importance of corporate 
governance and the board of directors as an integral part of the governance in large 
corporations (Bennedsen et al,2008). The board of directors have a dominant 
position in the current corporate governance debates. The main duties of the board 
are to monitor the management, to hire or fire the managers, to set executive 
compensations and align the interests of the managers and the shareholders 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985). The main important function of the board, is to 
safeguard the rights of the shareholders and resolve the agency conflict. Despite the 
prominence of study in this aspect, the managers still do not act in the best interests 
of the shareholders. This can be due to various reasons:  
a)the managers could act opportunistic and invest in unprofitable projects rather than 
paying dividends to the shareholders, b) since the managers have their finances 
linked to the capital of the firm, they bare risk and are risk averse as compared to the 
shareholders who are well diversified, c) managers are very narrow minded and 
produce immediate short term results in contrast with the shareholders who make 
their decisions based on long term results. All these suggest a manager  
shareholder conflict which is called as an agency problem (Vafeas and Theodorou, 
1998).  
It is important to research on board structure since its such an integral part of the 
governance system. However, the study of the same is very complicated. The main 
reason being, that various researchers have resulted in different and competing 
theories and the corporate laws along with the theory are majorly silent about the 
composition of board, size, compensation of directors, time , frequency of meeting 
and so on (Baysinger and Butler , 1985). This led to diversity in various elements 
mentioned above leading to differences in the board. 
Various theories have different contributions to the theory of corporate governance. 
All these theories aim on one aspect i.e. to link the characteristics of the board and 
firm performance. Agency theory is the most widely used theory of corporate 
governance that involves the aligning of interests and resolving the stakeholder-
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management conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, this theory illustrates that 
there is a conflict of interests among the managers and the shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Agency theory has certain implications and recommendations to 
solve the agency problem in firms. A clear implication of this theory is to monitor and 
control the management of the firm to avoid the conflict of interests between the 
managers and the shareholders (Fama and Jensen , 1983). It also leads to standard 
recommendations for the board to hold majority independent and outside directors 
on the board (Non-executive directors) and the position of the CEO and the 
chairman should be held by different individuals (Bosch, 1995).  
In contrast to this theory, stewardship theory states that managers are trustworthy 
and responsible hence are good guardians of the firm (Donaldson, 1990). It assumes 
that the insider managers in the firm have good knowledge about the firm and hence 
can take better decisions than the outside directors. Since they are honest and 
reliable they are assumed to maximise shareholder wealth. The managers will not 
act in their own personal benefit since they would not want to jeopardize their 
positions in the firm. Under this theory, the recommendations are that there should 
be more proportion of insider directors and the duality in position of the CEO and the 
chairman is considered as a positive strength to enhance the performance of the 
company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). 
In this context, countries like the US and UK also have contradictory but two different 
rules for the non- executive directors. Firstly, the non- executive directors are 
expected to have the same duties like the other executive directors and hence be on 
the board full time. Contradicting this, the non- executive directors should be 
independent as compared to their colleagues so as to have a self-determining role. 
The main reason for this is because the outside directors have certain duties like 
monitoring the management closely so as the rights of the shareholders are not 
misused, to set the executive compensation, supervising the quality and reliability of 
the financial disclosures and accountability of information and  disciplining the 
executive directors if they are underperforming (Sullivan, 2000). 
Thus it can be inferred, that various corporations have differences in terms of their 
functioning, objectivity, the composition of their boards, the control and power of the 
non  executive directors to monitor the management and safeguard the rights of the 
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shareholders and various other mechanisms. However, we can conclude by saying 
that corporate governance is shareholder oriented irrespective of the different 
theories or corporate laws. It can be considered that managers can be disciplined by 
various internal and external mechanisms. 
Mentioned below are some of the major characteristics of the board. 
2.3.2. Major characteristics of the board 
2.3.2. a. Board Composition, structure and functions 
The performance implications of board structure and composition have been 
evaluated in a growing body of organizational research, (Chaganti, Mahajan, & 
Sharma, 1985; Hill & Snell, 1988; Kesner, 1988; Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 1986; 
Kohls, 1985; Mattar & Ball, 1985; Norbum, 1986; Vance, 1983).The role of the board 
is typically controversial in the presence of different types of mechanisms to control 
agency costs in corporations (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). However, primarily the 
role of the board of directors is viewed in the earlier subsections as a solution to the 
issues of the manager-stakeholder conflicts (Oviatt, 1988). It is the role of the board 
to provide the shareholders with reliable information about the companys 
performance and the risk taking ability of the management which will lead to 
shareholder wealth maximisation (Cadbury Committee, 1992).The board of directors 
thus have the right to hire, fire, set the compensation of managers and monitor and 
control the actions of the management for the welfare of the shareholders. Thus, we 
can infer that the board is a vital part of the governance structure that reduces the 
conflicts caused due to the agency problem. As argued by Williamson (1985), "the 
board of directors should be regarded primarily as a governance structure 
safeguarding between the firm and owners of equity capital and secondarily as a 
way by which to safeguard the contractual relation between the firm and its 
management" (p. 298, emphasis added). To this secondary role of governance of the 
board, insider or executive directors play a very crucial role.  
In order to understand the effectiveness of board, its necessary understand the 
structure and function of board and its relation to protecting shareholder interest. As 
stated by Zahara and Pearce (1989), board performs simultaneous functions related 
to service, control and strategies. Thus, thorough understanding of roles of boards 
and their functions should go beyond a distinction of independent or non-
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independent. An integrative model of corporate governance, in a theoretical 
development as argued by Zahra and Pearce (1989) that incorporates the resource-
based, the class-hegemony, agency views of corporate governance and legalistic 
views. In identifying the board structure and composition in terms of its three 
important roles: such as oversight, service and strategy, the firms external 
contingencies such as industry, competitive environment, and legal environment 
would interact with firms internal contingencies such as life cycle, CEO style, size 
and resources. The functions related to oversight links to managerial monitoring, 
interest of shareholders and performance of the company (Carpenter, 1988; Chapin, 
1986; Ewing, 1979; Linck et al. 2005; Louden, 1982; Mattar and Ball, 1985; Mueller, 
1979; Vance, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The key roles of board members are 
strategic decision making and advising executives (Bavly. 1985; Estes, 1980; 
Kreiken, 1985; Harrison, 1987; Rosenstein, 1987; Schmidt and Brauer, 2006; 
Tashakori and Boulton, 1985; Waldo, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and role 
related to service would increase the reputation of company, external contacts would 
be strengthened, strategic bonds are facilitated with important entities (Carpenter, 
1988; Leibowitz, 1978; Louden, 1982; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2003; Vance, 
1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). As argued by Zahra and Pearce (1989), that the 
board members unique individual characteristics and three primary roles would 
enhance functions of the board. Furthermore, strategy development are the 
important area, where some board members may contribute while others may be 
involved in providing technical expertise, service etc. Monitoring function can be 
performed by an independent director and they can also provide knowledge and 
expertise in specific areas such as decision making process, information access and 
legitimacy which are valuable resources to the company.  
The board of directors are often portrayed as a legal body when active rather than a 
collection of separate individuals who have different functions. Here the researcher 
would like to explain the different types of directors that constitute the board on the 
basis of their functions. Directors are individuals who serve useful purposes along 
with strategic implementation apart from just the pure governance function 
emphasized in economic and law literature (Mace, 1971). There are mainly two 
types of directors as discussed earlier; the inside directors also called as executive 
directors and outside directors who are referred as non-executive directors.  
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The first types are full time executives in the firm along with being the members of 
the board. The involvement of executive directors in the board is also depicted as a 
strategic advantage since they can reward their subordinates, communicate 
information about the firm from the top management to the non-executive directors 
during board meetings and provide an opportunity to discuss matters relating to 
performance, top management or the potential of budding junior executives (Mace , 
1971 ; Gibbs, 1993). 
The second type of directors called the non-executive directors facilitates boards 
authorization to the strategies of the management, monitoring the performance of the 
firm and implementation of strategies that lead to welfare of the firm and the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). They are not uniform in terms of their 
function, relationship and knowledge. These directors can be categorized further into 
two types: affiliated and non-affiliated outsiders. The former types are the ones that 
have secured a place on the board due to their prior connection with the firm like 
they could be prior executives of the firm; they could even be suppliers or customers. 
The latter type are also called as independent non-executive directors. These 
directors have no other relationship with the firm, except their fees and stock 
ownership in the firm (Cadbury committee, 1992).  
However, significant importance is associated to the role of these independent 
individual directors on the board. These outside directors may have several qualities 
like leadership, judgement along with some differences in terms of their expertise 
(Pfeffer, 1972). For instance directors with financial link on the board can give easy 
access to credit and provide financial advice. They are jointly called as grey 
directors. Also as mentioned above these directors could also be customers and 
suppliers, in order to connect with different organisations (Pfeffer, 1976). This helps 
in coping with competition in the market and coordinating pricing strategies. 
As a starting point while examining board composition, three pivotal ideas are 
assumed, first, at the same time, different tasks will be performed by corporate 
boards, secondly, within the board each director plays a role by providing knowledge 
and skills and finally, according to the company characteristics and of their 
environment, corporate boards perform their tasks (Rindova, 1999).  As noted by 
Sullivan (1990), there is a wide variability to the capabilities to their problem solving 
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skills, professional experience and exposure to business and thus, each board 
member could differ in their contribution to the firm. Subsequently, in terms of choice 
in strategic decision making, each board member brings great variety to a firm. Thus, 
in combination with experience of the managers of the firm and also expertise, brings 
a smooth structure on decision making.  
Corporate governance is inclusive of certain aspects like, the board structure dealing 
with things like, board size and composition in terms of the proportion of number of 
outside and inside directors, board leadership, how knowledgeable and experienced 
the board members are, the number of outside directors and their competency and 
the rewards linked with the performance for the long term success of the firm. These 
features significantly highlight the capability of the board to provide independent and 
thoughtful understanding of the performance of the firm and the behaviour which is 
held responsible for the protection of rights of the shareholders (Gibbs, 1993). Also if 
the proportion of the outside directors is greater on the board, the management of 
the firm is monitored closely. Thus the level of risk faced by the investors is reduced 
and the involvement of the outside directors helps to provide unrestricted and 
political assurance towards the firm (Fama, 1980). 
As emphasized by corporate reformers and legal scholars, in order to have efficient 
governing body, the board should be comprised of independent directors. This was 
also further emphasized by economists  that a board with a collective nature should 
include both executive and non-executive directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). As 
latter plays an important role in facilitating the authorization of management 
strategies along with performance monitoring and its progress towards 
implementation of these suitable strategies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 
1985). Thus, the structure of the board has been viewed as a governing body within 
firms and the proportion of both the executive and the non-executive directors is 
considered important. 
 In addition, the management and administrative science literature also emphasized 
the importance of individual directors as these directors act as facilitators of strategy 
implementation and formulation. Apart from pure governance function, insider as well 
as outside directors also serves in formulating and implementation of strategy as 
stressed in the literature of law and economics (Mace, 1971). It is also emphasized 
that there are various other qualities that are possessed by these directors. These 
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qualities comprise of leadership skills, maturity, qualities of judgement and so on. 
Apart from this, directors also hold attributes, which are related to their occupation. 
For example, directors who are represented from the institute of finance may provide 
useful information related to credit and other financial market issues (Mace, 1971). In 
addition, in order to rationalize some of the problems related to exchange, it is 
common to call individual members from different independent organizations.  
Thus while the board is an essential part in the governance structure of the firm, 
directors also performs various tasks as individuals for enhancing the performance of 
the firm. This shows that the board consists of different individuals and the selection 
process of each type of individual is crucial to the performance of the firm.  Thus, the 
composition and structure of the board and its process is a key to financial 
performance and the success of a firm. Sometimes the board can be used to train 
the chief executive officer (CEO) as well. The main aspect of board composition is to 
study the proportion of independent directors included in the board. We will now see 
the impact of board size, diversity   and the impact of non-executive directors on a 
firms performance in the following sections. 
2.3.2. b. Effect of Board size on performance 
Stimulated by the failure and overhauls of large business corporations like Enron, 
WorldCom, General Motors, IBM and Time Warner the relation between board 
structure i.e. reducing the size of the board and its effectiveness on performance has 
received much attention. There is a vast amount of space devoted to the influence of 
the top management due to the executives, the monitoring by the directors, takeover 
threats and other governance mechanisms. However, little empirical work has been 
done on the influence of the size of the board on corporate performance.  
Yermack (1996) undertook the first empirical research of effects of board size on the 
performance of the company. For the purpose of his study, he examined 450 US 
firms from 1984 to 1991.  This study demonstrated negative effect of board size on 
performance.  According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), directors do not generally 
criticize the decisions of the managers or hold strong decisions that favour the 
performance of the organisation. They suggest that these issues increase with the 
increasing number of directors. Even though monitoring is assumed to be efficient 
with a larger board size, the benefits are outnumbered by drawbacks like slower 
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decision-making process, lack of important decisions for the progress of the 
management, the directors being risk averse and increase in free rider problems. 
Jensen (1993) also states that with a larger size of the board, directors lay emphasis 
on politeness and consideration rather than truth and honesty. The results of his 
study also state that a board with more than nine members is ineffective and gives 
CEOs the power to control. A larger board can increase the agency problems in a 
firm thus making it easy for the CEO to control and influence the decisions of the firm 
and become more powerful (Cheng, 2008). Overall, the negative effect of board size 
on the performance of the firm is confirmed by these group of researchers.  
However, there is another group of researchers that state contradictory views about 
the effect of the size of the board and the performance of the firm. This group of 
researchers are of the view that a larger board size will bring in directors from 
diverse backgrounds and different set of knowledge, thus enhancing the 
performance of the firm. Also larger boards are meant to be more cautious in 
decision making process for the firm, since any mistakes made would be costing 
them their reputation and the losses for which are higher than any other personal 
gains. According to Goilden and Zajac, 2001 boards that are smaller in size face lack 
of any initiative in making a strategic change in the firm, or the lack of understanding 
and confidence of making any change. Using variables like the CEO turnover and 
director appointments to examine the effect of board composition on performance of 
firms, researchers like Weisbasch (1998); Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) obtained 
positive results between the two variables. Byrd and Hickman (1992) and 
Shivdasani(1993)has also confirmed a positive relationship between the size of the 
board and the performance of the firm. 
There is a third group of researchers that state that the relationship between the two 
variables namely the size of the board and the performance is an inverted U shaped 
curve. These researchers state that the performance of the firm is positive until the 
size of the board goes beyond the optimal point (Goilden and Zajac, 2001 and 
Vafeas, 1999). As per the cognitive perspective on governance, a board is 
responsible to face complex issues and tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and the 
directors of boards help a lot by contributing with their cognitive abilities such as 
scanning, interpretations, and better choice (Rindova, 1999). Thus, the argument 
arising from cognitive perspective suggests that the number of outside directors is 
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positively related with the performance. Forbes and Milliken (1999) further discusses 
that with the larger board size, the power and cohesiveness of the board members 
may start decreasing and that will decrease the ability to use the cognitive skills and 
knowledge of the board members. Similar literature suggests that large board size 
and diversity in directors may dissipate the power and cohesiveness of the board 
and that will obstruct the strategic involvement of the board directors in decision 
making and performance (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Taking consideration of the 
demand of strategic involvement of the board members being positively related with 
the CEO perceptions of the effectiveness of board's decision making, it can be said 
that a inverted U-shaped relation is likely which suggests that the effectiveness of 
board's strategic participation increases with the increase in size of board up to a 
point. After reaching this peak point, the effectiveness of board's strategic 
participation starts decreasing with the increase in number of board members 
(Fiegener, 2005). This third group of researchers thus incorporate both the ideas that 
suggest positive growth in performance with increase in board size and decline in 
performance with increase in board size beyond a particular optimum level.  
There were another set of researchers that stated there was no link between the size 
of the board and the performance of the company. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Fosberg (1989) and Klein (1996) all fail to confirm any relation between the 
composition of the board and performance. 
However there is one problem in studying the effect of board size, since the number 
of directors can vary in different firms. This problem arises endogenously as a result 
of the elements like size, performance of the company, and the needs of the CEO 
and so on. Sometimes the CEOs might deceive the shareholders by including 
independent directors in the firm illustrating a picture of an active monitoring system 
(Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Often the size of the board also depends on the 
willingness of the CEOs in the firm. Thus we cannot directly accept the association 
of board size and performance without specifying alternative explanations. Also the 
optimum level beyond which the effect of board size and performance illustrates a 
negative relationship due to the inverted U shaped curve would be difficult to find, 
since the exact number of directors to be included in a board of a specific firm is also 
uncertain. Each firm has to decide and find a perfect trade-off between the benefits 
of having adequate capabilities and the costs arising due to the ineffectiveness of the 
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directors. The number of directors for a small or medium sized firm ranges from 
three to five (Jensen, 1989).  
Based on these contradictory views regarding the effect of board size and 
performance, the lack of a conceptual model for the optimum level of members to be 
included in the board, the potential advantages and disadvantages of having a larger 
diverse set of members on the board, the researcher has formed the first and the 
third hypothesis for this dissertation. 
2.3.2. c. Board diversity  
As mentioned earlier, board of directors is the fundamental part of internal 
governance mechanisms that intend to closely align the interests of the managers, 
stakeholders and monitor the actions of the management. One of the major 
governance issues faced by firms today is the diversity in these boards in terms of 
their age, gender and independence. Diversity can be typically distinguished into two 
aspects: observable diversity (Demographics) e.g. age, ethnicity, race, gender and 
non-observable diversity (Cognitive) e.g. perceptions, values, beliefs (Watson and 
Merritt, 1998).  
The vast literature on diversity and performance has in general some contrasting 
perspectives. Some researchers suggest that diversity can be a potential advantage; 
while others contradict by saying diversity can be a disadvantage as well. We first 
look at the advantages and then study the disadvantages mentioned by some 
researchers. 
Usually the impact of diversity on performance focuses on demographic or 
observable diversity i.e. age, gender, race. Some researchers suggest that diversity 
is an advantage since it leads to a wider base of knowledge, vision and innovation 
which in turn acts as a competitive advantage (Watson and Merritt, 1998). It also 
leads to better performance of the firm since the directors encompass different skills 
and expertise from diverse fields. There were several other studies carried out based 
on diversity and firm performance in terms of cultural diversity, experience diversity, 
cognitive diversity, and educational diversity and so on. Similar findings were 
suggested by Simons and Pelled (1999) and they reported that there was a positive 
link to educational and cognitive diversity to that of the performance of the firm. 
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Maznevski (1994) also studied that group diversity is positive related to the 
performance of the company. She stated that group diversity is a potential 
advantage in terms of decision making, integration and communication. Also the 
work of Siciliano (1996) was based on 240 YMCA organisations for the comparisons 
of diversity within the board. The findings suggested that gender diversity plays a 
positive role in the performance of the company and more funds were raised for 
social welfare. 
However there have been several researchers who have contradicted these findings. 
They state that diversity can have its own limitations as well. The findings of 
Hambrick et al (1996) were based on the performance of the top management team 
and diversity was measured in terms of their functions, education and tenure. He 
suggested that homogeneous group members outperformed the heterogeneous 
groups. The heterogeneous groups would disagree to decisions, act slowly thereby 
weakening the team. Researchers like Knight et al (1999) and Treichler (1995) have 
concluded that diversity is negatively related to performance, since it makes the 
process of decision making slower and increases the expenditure of satisfying the 
needs of different teams thus affecting performance. In sum, it appears there is 
some vague evidence about the effects of diversity on the performance of the firm.  
Finally Murray (1989) based his study on 84 Fortune 500 companies to compare the 
role of heterogeneous and homogenous groups and their effect on organisational 
performance. The results suggested that the link between performance and diversity 
depends on the type of market the organisation is operating in. The findings state 
that in a situation of intense market competition homogeneous groups outperform 
the heterogeneous groups. On the other hand heterogeneous groups performed 
better when the firm was undergoing a change suggesting that this group can 
respond to a dynamic market change. 
Although there has been mixed evidence regarding the link between diversity and 
performance, diversity is desirable due to two reasons. First it increases the 
discussions, helps in the exchange of ideas and improves group performance 
(Watson and Merritt , 1998). It provides new insights and perspectives thus 
improving the performance of the board and the firm. Lastly, if we state that the role 
of the board of directors is to align and protect the interests of the stakeholders, then 
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it is rightly said that the board should consist of members that represent these 
stakeholders (Huse and Rindova, 2001).  
2.3.2. d. The impact of Non  Executive Directors on corporate performance. 
An important aspect of the governance practice is monitoring the actions of the 
management which is the role of non-executive directors. It is a crucial part in the 
composition of the board. The role of the non-executive directors to monitor the 
behaviour of their colleague executives is primary to the governance angle of a firm 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985).These directors identify with the interests of the 
shareholders since they invest their reputation capital in the firm. Since they are 
professionals and excel in their field of knowledge, they can help in making the right 
decision for the firm and restrict the management if it acts in their own self-interest 
(Cadbury, 1992). It is recommended to have a certain minimum number of outside 
directors on the board, and these members should play an active role in the areas of 
conflict within the firm which are likely to rise (Cadbury, 1992). A large proportion of 
empirical research and findings have attempted to evaluate the contribution of non-
executive directors to a firm. 
The findings of Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) were based on 200 UK companies 
both industrial and commercial and 50 financial institutions. He studied the influence 
of part time board members primarily non-executive directors on the firms. These 
part time members were either non-executive directors or/and chairman of the firms. 
From his study, he inferred that the power and the influence of these members 
depends on a set of simultaneous and interrelated effects of structural factors, 
position, expertise and willingness to transform potential power into actual influence. 
A great deal of research has also been carried out on the impact of shareholder 
welfare due monitoring and  the contribution of non-executive directors or also their 
impact of resolving conflicts due to differences in interests among the shareholders 
and the managers. Baysinger and Butler (1985) through their findings suggest that 
number of non-executive directors have a positive but a delayed impact on the 
financial performance of the firm. This was also supported by findings of researchers 
like Schellenger et al (1989) and Pearce and Zahra (1992). There were several 
findings illustrated by various other researchers too. For example, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) found that companies would replace the executive directors by a 
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number of non- executive directors after a sequence of poor performance. While on 
the other hand Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) state that, the announcement of non-
executive directors helps to increase the share price of the firm. Weisbach (1988) 
also illustrated that the number of non-executive members are directly related to the 
replacement of CEOs by the non-executive directors due to their underperformance. 
This behaviour of the non-executive directors in replacing the CEOs has been 
studied by a number of researchers as well. The replacement of CEOs due to their 
poor performance in the firm, and the appointment of the non-executive directors 
leads to a considerable progress in the performance of the company and 
shareholder wealth (Borokhovich, 1996). 
The evidence of these several studies carried out by researchers strengthens the 
power and influence of the non-executive directors on firms.  
However, there are several researchers that state that the link between the number 
of non-executive directors and the performance as negatively related. They state that 
although the non-executive directors bring different expertise and a vast source of 
knowledge, it is very difficult to convert this to value for the organisation. Sometimes 
the impact of non-executive directors is negative since the company gives them no 
importance and counts them under the level of the board. This was supported by the 
findings of Lorsch and MacIver (1989). 
Given the available evidence about the presence of a large proportion of non-
executive directors and the positive and negative impact on the shareholder wealth 
and performance of the company, it is important to note that various researchers did 
not find any relation between the composition of the board (i.e. non-executive 
directors) and the performance of the company (Sullivan, 2000).Various firms do not 
Cadbury Code and have few non-executive directors on the board. These firms have 
a further inclination towards one troop leadership structure within the organisation 
.However; surprisingly it was examined in their study that the firms that do not 
comply with the Cadbury Code are more likely to survive than the firms that follow 
the suggestions of the Code. The non-executive directors are required to excel at 
good decision making process and the executive directors on the other hand are 
supposed to cover good management skills (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). These 
conflicting roles of the non-executive and executive directors explain the failure of 
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non-executive directors to enforce right governance mechanism in a firm (Ezzamel 
and Watson, 2005).Boyd, 1994 and Kren and Kerr, 1997 found very little significance 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and the performance of the firms. 
Based on these contrasting views of the researchers about the impact of non-
executive directors on the performance of the firm, the researcher sets the second 
hypothesis of this dissertation. 
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2.4.Conclusion 
As per the literature review mentioned above, it is clear that the board of directors 
are a pivotal part of the composition of the firm which in turn is central to set the 
governance mechanisms in a firm. However there are several contradictory views for 
the size of the board and the number of non-executive directors and their effect on 
performance. The researcher has studied the board level literature in particular and 
hence has put forth the following hypothesis: 
Based on the contradictory opinions on size of the board: 
Hypothesis 1: Larger board size would enhance the performance of the firm as it 
would have a valuable blend of directors from diverse backgrounds with different 
expertise. Thus, larger board size would lead in better strategic decisions and hence 
positively affect the performance of the firm. 
Based on the contrasting opinions on the number of non-executive directors: 
Hypothesis 2: Larger the number of non-executive directors greater the 
independence and improvement in the performance of the company since these 
directors will focus on the core business of the firm. 
Hypothesis 3: The board's strategic participation in a company is related with the 
board size in an inverted U-shaped curve.  A company with a modest board size will 
have greater strategic participation of board members and hence, better 
performance than in a company with lesser or much more number of board 
members. 
Thus, the literature review in this chapter leads to form the methodology based on 
the above mentioned hypothesis explained in the next session. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1.Introduction 
Methodology can be defined as The analysis of, the rationale for, the particular 
methods or methods used in a given study (Jankwicz,1995). This chapter looks at 
the method used by the researcher for the purpose of the dissertation. It includes 
different sections and explains details of the sample selection of data, the 
advantages of the research methodology used, the criteria for using secondary data 
and further analysing the method used to analyse the output. 
3.2. Sample selection of data 
This study aims at testing the three hypothesis mentioned above in the previous 
chapter. The first and the most important decision made in order to test these 
hypothesis was the use of secondary data through the annual reports of selected 
companies. This decision made by the researcher was based on logic and rationale 
since it would be difficult to collect primary or original data to test the mentioned 
hypothesis. The research available for this topic is vast which in turn has helped the 
researcher to identify the methodology that can be successful. A review of the data 
collected through secondary research helps the researcher to decide what needs to 
be done and what can be done. Thus, data collected from secondary research can 
be a rich basis to test the hypothesis (Malhotra, 2005). 
For constructing a data set to test the hypothesis, the researcher has selected 40 
FTSE 100 companies. Since they are all listed on the London stock exchange they 
comply with the corporate governance code. The sample set is heterogeneous since 
the companies selected are from different industries. This heterogeneous sample 
can lead to richness in data and provide an overall look for the UK companies as a 
whole. The full list of the sample companies along with the websites is given in 
Appendix 1. 
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3.3. Advantages of secondary data collection 
The data that is not obtained originally and is collected with the help of published and 
unpublished sources is called secondary data (Gupta, 2008). There are several 
advantages in the collection of secondary data: 
Firstly it is easy and convenient to collect information; it is relatively inexpensive than 
the process of collection of primary data and it is easily accessible. It also helps the 
researcher define a specific problem, identify and recognise the problem, have a 
better insight to approach and solve the issue, formulate an appropriate design for 
the identified variables, test the hypothesis and thus enable to answer the research 
question (Malhotra, 2005, pp.131). 
3.4. The use of balance sheet variables. 
For the purpose of the dissertation, the researcher has used the annual reports of 
the sample UK companies. For a better understanding and use of the model 
described above, the researcher has taken into account the comparison between 
two years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. The researcher has used some variables from 
the income statements and other sections relating to the board of directors from 
these sample companies. These variables are as follows: 
 
x Profit before tax (Dependent Variable)  
x Operating Profit (Dependent Variable)  
x Total no of directors on the board (Independent variable) 
x Percentage of non-executive directors on the board (Independent variable) 
x Turnover (Control Variable) 
x Squared Board Size (adjusted squared total no. of directors on the board) 
(Independent variable) 
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3.5. Measures adopted for the proposed hypothesis 
The researcher has used the multiple linear regression method to test the hypothesis 
since the model includes regress and variable depending on more than two 
variables. Thus, in short, multiple regression models are a technique that helps to 
examine the relationship between two or more variables at one time (Hair et al, 
1998). The main objective to test the projected hypothesis with this method is to 
identify the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. Thus, multiple 
linear regression models are suggested in this scenario. 
The utilization of this technique helps to analyse the relation of independent 
variables to the dependent variables all of which are identified in our study. Also the 
significance of each can be tested. The co-efficient attached to each variable 
(Independent variables) indicates the percentage change in the dependent variable 
with every one unit change in the independent variable. Furthermore, as the case of 
research is of multiple linear regression, the researcher would like to check whether 
the board size and the dependent variables namely profit before tax and operating 
profit are in linear regression or are they in polynomial regression, and if they are in 
polynomial regression, do they further show an inverted U shaped relationship.  
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Conclusion: 
Based on the methodology described above to support the hypothesis, the next 
chapter further looks at the results and findings of the regression model. 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Results 
4.1. Introduction 
This section includes the findings and the results of the regression analysis carried 
out using the SPSS 15 statistical software. The results are shown in the table format 
in the following sub-sections for clarity and better understanding. In addition, the 
researcher has illustrated a detailed explanation of the data collected (findings of a 
multiple regression model). Multiple linear regression analysis was carried out in 
order to find out an association between board of directors (Board size) and the 
percentage of non-executive directors with operating profit and profit before tax as 
indicators of corporate performance of the firm. In order to check whether there is a 
possible inverted U shaped relation between the squared term of board size and its 
regression over profits before tax and the operating profit, a square term of the 
Board size has been added.  Since there was a wide variation within these 
dependent variables, these variables were transformed into logged versions. 
Turnover of companies (independent variable) was directly associated with 
performance of the firm, thus, this was also added in the model as a control variable. 
However, there was a wide variance for this control variable, thus, turnover variable 
was checked for heteroskedasticity and transformed into its logged version and 
adjusted while performing the analysis.  
Note: It would be important to note and highlight the point that variables like 
profit before tax , operating profit and turnover are the logged versions. Profit 
before Tax would thus mean the logged profit before tax, operating profit 
would mean logged operating profit and turnover would mean logged turnover 
of firms. 
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4.2. Table 1.Multivariate analysis with special reference to logged operating profit for the year 2006-07 
 
* Not applicable SE  Standard Error of Mean; Multivariate model: Included board of directors, percentage of non-executive 
directors ,squared board of directors and **logged turnover.
Dependent variable : Corporate performance of firms 
Logged operating profit for the year 2006-2007 
 
 Variables 
ȕ-coefficient SE T F P value 
Independent variables : Multivariate model 
Intercept -0.825 0.722 -1.143 2.294 0.260 
Board of Directors -0.034 0.045 -0.752 - 0.457 
Squared Board of Directors - 0.019 0.018 -0.382 - 0.091 
Non executive Directors, % 0.018 0.008 2.153 - 0.038 
Turnover 2006-07** -0.747 0.607 -1.230 - 0.226 
R Square 0.160 * * * * 
Adjusted R square 0.091 * * * * 
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Table 1 shows the multivariate analysis with corporate performance of firms with 
special reference to logged operating profit for the year 2006-07. The researcher 
included dependent variable as logged operating profit and independent variables as 
board of directors and percentage of non- executive directors and logged turnover 
along with squared terms of board of directors and percentage of non-executive 
directors. 
The important elements to be used in the assessment of the regression model are 
described in detail for Table 1, since the same will be applicable to all the cases. 
R- Square:  As explained earlier, R-square is the measure of how well the 
regression line fits the data. It is also termed as the coefficient of determination or 
the measure of Goodness Of fit (Gujrathi and Sangeetha, 2007). The value of R-
square lies between 0 and 1 and closer the value to 1, the higher the explanatory 
power of the entire model. In table 1 the value of R - square is 0.160 which indicates  
that there is only 16%  of change in the operating profit of the company explained by 
the board size of a company and this was mainly contributed by the percentage of 
non-executive directors (ȕ=0.018, p=0.038). The value of R-square lies between 0 - 
1, shows that model has an explanatory power. However, the non-decreasing 
property of R-square is a weakness due to which the change due to the increased 
number of independent variables can be further explained by the adjusted R-square.  
Adjusted R- square:  In case of any addition of new independent variables in the 
model, adjusted R-square is introduced to enhance the results obtained. As 
compared to R-square, adjusted R-square can increase or decrease with the 
introduction of additional independent variables. However, the change in adjusted R-
square is dependent on the explanatory power and the significance of the newly 
added independent variables. In the table above adjusted R-square is 0.091, which 
shows that the explanatory power of the model still reduces with the increase of 
independent variables.  
F-Test: After the review of R-square and adjusted R-square, it is important to test the 
model for statistical significance. There are two procedures namely the F-test and F- 
ratio to test the significance of the model. The F-statistic should be significant for the 
overall significance of the regression model. The F-statistical value in table 1 is 2.294 
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along with a significance level of 0.094, which means a significant level greater than 
the acceptable level of 10 percent.  
The regression Co-efficient associated with the model: The coefficient in a 
regression model, show the change in the dependent variable due to a unit change 
in the independent variable. SPSS labels these coefficients with the term B co-
efficient. If the independent variable generates a larger B value, then the influence of 
that independent variable on the dependent variable is the most powerful. In the 
above table, the regression coefficient ( B value) for the board of directors was -
0.034, which states that with one member increase in the board, the performance of 
the firm decreases by 0.03%. However, a negative beta value also indicates, that 
there was a negative association between the total number of directors and logged 
operating profit for the year 2006-2007. In addition, the beta value is higher than the 
acceptable significant limit of 10% (p=0.457).  This shows that there is a negative yet 
an insignificant association between the board of directors and the performance of 
the firm in terms of the logged operating profit for the year 2006-07. The regression 
coefficient of the squared board size was -0.019 also the beta value is less than 10% 
(p<0.001). Thus, a negative yet significant association is observed between the 
squared board size and performance of the firm. The regression coefficient of (-
0.019) suggest that the performance of the firm decreased by 0.019% with each 
square unit increase in the board of directors.  
The regression coefficient of the percentage of the number of non-executive 
directors is 0.018 taking logged operating profit into account, which states that with 
every one member increase in the number of non-executive directors on the board, 
the performance of the firm increases by 0.1%. In addition the beta value is less that 
10% (p <0.1). Thus, positive and a significant association are observed between the 
percentage of non-executive directors and the performance of the firm.  
Thus, a negative but insignificant association for the board of directors and a positive 
and significant association for the percentage of non-executive directors and 
performance of the firm along with a strong relation with the squared board size with 
performance of the firm, measured in terms of logged operating profit for the year 
2006-2007. The intercept term is also negative.  However, in our case it has very 
little economic meaning, since it does not represent any likely outcome. In short, 
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according to the findings in the above table, hypothesis 1 related to the size of the 
board (total number of directors) and the performance of the firm in terms of the 
logged operating profit, is rejected, while hypothesis 2 related to the percentage of 
non-executive directors and the performance of the firm has a positive association 
and is accepted. In addition, the significant relation between square terms and the 
performance of the firm also indicates that Hypothesis 3 is acceptable. 
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4.3.Table 2.  Multivariate analysis with special reference to logged profit before tax for the year 2006-07  
Dependent variable : Corporate performance of firms 
Logged Profit Before Tax 2006-2007 
 
Variables 
ȕ-coefficient SE T F P value 
Independent variables : Multivariate model 
Intercept -0.708 0.092 -7.650 49.13 0.001 
Board of directors 0.005 0.006 0.882 - 0.383 
Squared board of directors 0.010 0.012 0.876 - 0.098 
Non executive directors, % 0.013 0.001 12.038 - 0.001 
Turnover 2006-07** -0.012 0.078 -0.153 - 0.879 
R Square 0.804 * * * * 
Adjusted R square 0.787 * * * * 
 
* Not applicable SE  Standard Error of Mean; Multivariate model: Included board of directors, percentage of non-executive 
directors, squared board of directors and **logged turnover
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 Table 2 shows the multivariate analysis with corporate performance of firms with 
special reference to profit before tax for the year 2006-7. The researcher included 
dependent variable as logged profit before tax and independent variable as board of 
directors, percentage of non -executive directors and logged turnover (Control 
variable).   
The R-square value was 0.804, which indicates that there is 80% change in the 
logged profit before tax of the company and adjusted R-square is 0.787, which 
shows that the explanatory power of the model still reduces with the increase of 
independent variables. In addition the F-value was 49.13 along with a significance 
level of 0.001, which means a significant level of less than 10 percent along with a 
positive impact on the performance of the firm. Thus the model is statistically 
significant. 
In the above table, the regression coefficient (beta value) related to the total number 
of directors was 0.005, which states that with every one member increase in the 
board of directors the performance of the firm increases by less than 0.1%. In 
addition, the beta value is higher than the acceptable significant limit of 10% 
(p=0.383). Thus, positive but insignificant association indicated that there was no 
association between board of directors and logged profit before tax for the year 
2006-2007. The regression coefficient related to square of total number of directors 
is 0.010 which suggest that 0.1% increase in performance was observed with a 
square unit increase in the board of directors and the beta value is lesser than the 
acceptable limit of 10% (p=0.098). Thus, a positive and a significant relation between 
square of board of directors and performance of the firm.  
 The regression coefficient value of non-executive directors was 0.013 after taking 
logged profit before tax into an account, states that with one member increase in the 
number of  non- executive directors, the performance of the firm increased by 0.1%. 
In addition, the beta value is lower than the acceptable significant limit of 10% 
(p<0.001). Thus, positive and significant association indicated that there was an 
association between percentage of non-executive directors and logged profit before 
tax for the year 2006-2007.  
Thus, a positive but insignificant association for the board of directors and positive 
but significant association for the percentage of non-executive directors and 
43

performance of the firm, along with significant relation between squared board size 
and performance of firm, measured in terms of logged profit before tax for the year 
2006-2007. The intercept term is negative.  However, in our case it has very little 
economic meaning, since it does not represent any likely outcome. Thus according 
to the findings in table 2, hypothesis 1, relating to the board size and the 
performance of the firm has been rejected, while Hypothesis 2 relating to the 
percentage of number of non-executive directors to the performance of the firm has 
been accepted. In addition, the square term of board size has positive significant 
association with performance of the firm; hence, Hypothesis 3 seems to be 
reasonable too and hence accepted.  
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4.4. Table 3.  Multivariate analysis with special reference to logged operating profit for the year 2007-08 
Dependent variable : Corporate performance of firms 
Logged operating profit for the year 2007-2008 
 
Variables 
ȕ-coefficient SE T F P value 
Independent variables : Multivariate model 
Intercept 0.376 0.423 0.889 1.079 0.380 
Board of directors 0.001 0.026 0.049 - 0.962 
Squared board of directors 0.002 0.065 0.096 - 0.158 
Non executive directors, % -0.001 0.005 -0.169 - 0.866 
Turnover 2007  08** 0.131 0.074 1.769 - 0.085 
R Square 0.083 * * * * 
Adjusted R square 0.006 * * * * 
 * Not applicable  
SE  Standard Error of Mean; Multivariate model: Included board of directors, percentage of non-executive directors and **logged 
turnover.
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 Table 3 shows the multivariate analysis with corporate performance of firms with 
special reference to logged operating profit for the year 2007-8. The researcher 
included dependent variable as logged operating profit and independent variable as 
board of directors, percentage of non- executive directors and logged turnover.  
 The R-square value was 0.083 which indicates that there is only 8% change in the 
operating profit of the company which is explained by the board size and the 
percentage of non-executive directors of the company. In addition, the adjusted R-
square is 0.006, which shows that the explanatory power of the model still reduces 
with the increase of independent variables. The F-statistical value is 1.079 along with 
a significance level of 0.370, which means a significant level of greater than 10 
percent.  In the above table, the regression coefficient (beta value) related to the size 
of the board was 0.001, which states that with one member increase in the board the 
performance of the firm increase by less than 0.1%.  However, a positive beta value 
indicates, that there was a positive association between the total number of directors 
and logged operating profit for the year 07-2008. In addition, the beta value is higher 
than the acceptable significant limit of 10% (p<0.962). Thus, positive but insignificant 
association indicated that there was no association between board of directors and 
logged operating profit for the year 2007-2008. The regression coefficient for 
squared terms of board members is 0.002, positive and very low, yet the p-value is 
with a significance level of 0.158, that is, lower than the allowed 10%. Hence, a 
positive and insignificant relationship between the total number of directors and 
logged operating profit for the year 07-2008. 
 The regression coefficient value of percentage of non-executive directors was -
0.001 after taking logged turnover into an account, which states that with one 
percent increase in the non-executive directors, the performance of the firm 
decreased by less than 0.1%. In addition, the beta value is higher than the 
acceptable significant limit of 10% (p=0.866). Thus, negative and insignificant 
association indicated that there was no association between percentage of non-
executive directors and logged operating profit for the year 2007-2008. Thus, all 
hypothesises are rejected for the year 2007-08 with special reference to logged 
operating profit. 
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4.5. Table 4.  Multivariate analysis with special reference to logged profit before tax for the year 2007-08 
Dependent variable : Corporate performance of firms 
Logged Profit Before Tax 2007-2008 
 
Variables 
ȕ-coefficient SE T F P value 
Independent variables : Multivariate model 
Intercept -0.861 0.174 -4.953 18.748 0.001 
Board of directors 0.013 0.011 1.213 - 0.233 
Squared board of directors 0.026 0.023 1.342 - 0.098 
Non executive directors, % 0.015 0.002 7.269 - 0.001 
Turnover 2007  2008** 0.003 0.303 0.086 - 0.932 
R Square 0.610 * * * * 
Adjusted R square 0.577 * * * * 
* Not applicable; SE  Standard Error of Mean; Multivariate model: Included board of directors, percentage of non-executive 
directors and **logged turned over for respective period.
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 Table 4 shows the multivariate analysis with corporate performance of firms with 
special reference to profit before tax for the year 2007-8. The researcher included 
dependent variable as logged profit before tax and independent variable as board of 
directors, percentage of non-executive directors and logged turnover.   
The R-square value was 0.610 which indicates that there is 61% change in the 
logged profit before tax of the company is explained by the total number if directors 
(board size) and the percentage of non-executive directors. The adjusted R-square 
is 0.577, which shows that the explanatory power of the model still reduces with the 
increase of independent variables. In addition, the F-value was 18.748 along with a 
significance level of 0.001 which means a significant level of less than 10 percent. 
Hence, the model is statistically significant. In the above table, the regression 
coefficient (beta value) was 0.013, which states that with one member increase in 
the board of directors, the performance of the firm increases by 0.1%. In addition, the 
beta value is higher than the acceptable significant limit of 10% (p=0.233). Thus, 
positive but insignificant association indicated that there was no significant 
association between board of directors and logged operating profit for the year 2007-
2008. On the other hand, the regression coefficient of the squared term of board size 
is 0.026, that is 0.026% of increase in profits with each square unit increase in 
number of board directors was observed, while the p-value is 0.098, that is, close to 
10% yet smaller than 10%, hence a significant and positive relation between 
performance of the firm and square terms of board size. The regression coefficient 
(beta value) value of percentage of non-executive directors was 0.015 after taking 
logged turnover into an account, which states that with the increase of every unit of 
non-executive directors, the performance of the firm increases by 0.1%. In addition, 
the beta value is lower than the acceptable significant limit of 10% (p<0.001). Thus, 
positive and significant association indicated that there was a significant association 
between percentage of non-executive directors and logged profit before tax for the 
year 2007-2008. 
 Thus, a positive but insignificant association for the board of directors and the 
performance of the firm, measured in terms of logged profit before tax for the year 
2007-2008 illustrates that hypothesis 1 is rejected. The intercept term is negative.  
However, in our case it has very little economic meaning, since it does not represent 
any likely outcome. Thus, overall we can infer that percentage of non- executive 
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directors has a positive impact on the performance of the firm and hence hypothesis 
2 relating to the percentage of non-executive directors and performance is accepted. 
In addition, the squared terms of board size also have a significant relation with 
logged profit of the firm. Hence, a relative inverted U-shape relation between the 
independent variable board size and dependent variable performance of the firm is 
also visible, that is hypothesis 3 holds some gravity and hence it is accepted. 
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4.6 Conclusion: 
In conclusion, overall, multivariate regression analysis showed that there was a 
strong and significant relationship with percentage of non- executive directors and 
Logged Profit before Tax than the logged Operating profit of companies. No such 
association exists for board of directors and performance of the firm measured in 
terms of logged profit before tax and logged operating profit. Also, a significant 
relation between squared terms of board size and the logged performance of the firm 
is present. In the next chapter, the researcher has explained these findings in detail 
and supported it with the existing literature. 
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Chapter 5: Detailed Analysis  
5.1. Overview 
Out of several studies detailed above, some have reported findings similar to this 
study while others have reported just opposite findings. The contrasting views not 
only invite discussion across studies but also possible explanations for the observed 
effects. Along with these differences in views about the composition of the board by 
various researchers, the absence of a theoretical model makes it difficult for policy 
makers and managers to generalize the benefits of a particular board size (Young, et 
al, 2005).  
This chapter discusses the findings of this study in the light of previous studies and 
opinions and tries to ultimately reach to a consensus over the impact of the size of 
the board on performance. The findings of the present study are either supported 
with similar observations from previous studies or criticized with contrasting 
observations. The gaps in the literature are either explained based on new 
observations or suggested possible explanations. The researcher in this work has 
specifically aimed to comment on the possible effect of larger board size on 
performance and the effect of non-executive directors on the corporate performance 
of the selected sample companies along with the test for the inverted U shaped 
relationship between the size of the board and the performance of the company.   
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5.2. Does the size of board of directors affect corporate performance? 
Our findings illustrated that a large sized board of directors does not improve 
performance of the firms. The ȕ-coefficient in Tables 1-4 showed a very small either 
positive or negative value, however, the effect did not reach any statistical 
significance. Therefore, it is clear from our study that increasing the size of the board 
does not improve the performance significantly and there was no statistical link 
between size of the board and the performance of the company in terms of both 
logged operating profit and profit before tax. We tested the above hypothesis using 
both logged profit before tax and logged operating profit across two financial years 
(2006-07 and 2007-08), however, none supported the statement that larger board 
size improves the performance. Therefore, it is clear that increasing the size of the 
board is not essentially the key to improved performance.  
At the same time, there are experts with opinion who believe that a larger board size 
would lead to a negative impact on the performance of the company. It has been 
stated that the negative impact could be due to several factors associated with a 
larger board such as slow decision making process, coordination problems and 
increase in agency issues like free rider problems (Yermack, 1996; Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992). Sharing the above opinion, Cheng (2008) stated that larger board 
size gives the undue transfer of power in the hands of the chief executive officer 
(CEO). As stated above, the definition of the large or small board is what needs to be 
taken into account to really account for impact on performance as a matter of the 
size of the board. It is possible that the definition of small or large differs across the 
studies and it is therefore difficult to reach to a consensus. Our analysis did not 
support the view that increased board size may have adverse effect on performance.  
The study of various researchers states that a larger board could have members 
from different backgrounds, who would bring different knowledge to ultimately help 
frame better strategies, seems quite strong. It is convincingly true that people with 
different opinions could give critical inputs in decision making, which could yield 
more user friendly policies, ultimately improving performance. Therefore, there must 
be very strong opponent factors, which may alleviate the effect of increase in board 
size, if the latter really improves the performance. Among several possible issues 
compromising or limiting performance in a larger board, the main issues are the 
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problem of communication and co-ordination within the organization. Apart from 
bringing in diverse knowledge, a larger board also brings in the possible conflicts the 
members could have on each others opinion. A decision, which could enhance 
performance and would have passed by majority may have some issues from few 
members such that the management has to either compromise with the point or have 
to altogether discard the idea. Therefore, the first and foremost conflicting issue with 
a larger board seems to be difficulty of reaching to a consensus on an issue. Failure 
of consensus between board members could raise several possible complications 
(Eisenberg, 1998). The first and primary complication could be failure to implement 
several good proposals, which could be key ones for the firm. Second important 
impact of failure of consensus could be wastage of time of the board. Suppose one 
or two members of the board have conflict on some issue, it could take time to make 
them understand the problem and proposed solution such that the same decision is 
taken in a longer time than usual, which again affects the performance. Third and 
most important could be the possibility of some possible and permanent conflicts 
between the members (Eisenberg et al, 1998). Once the board identifies a particular 
member who is often of different view, it could have negative impact on decision 
making such that the members overlook the performance over their personal issues 
with such a member. We were restricted due to time and the vastness of study to 
analyze the effect of size without taking into account the above parameters, thereby 
restricting our ability to figure out the responsible factor for not improving the 
performance with larger sized board.  
It has also been stated that as the size of the board increases, the ability of the 
board to monitor the management of the firm decreases, thereby increasing the 
conflicts arising in the organization. Eisenberg et al (1998) stated that a larger board 
size makes it difficult to focus on managerial discussions that hold value and thus 
transfer greater control in the hands of the CEO. This is another side of what we 
have discussed in the above paragraph. In case of a large board, the delay in 
decisions and the possible conflicts could force the top managers such as CEO to 
take decisions on their own, which could miss expert opinion from several competent 
individuals of the board. This may not only compromise with decision making but 
also transfer additional duties on top managers of the company. Increased workload 
on the managers may lead to further complications and affect several other sectors 
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of the firm, which may need their attention more urgently than these issues. It is 
probably because of these reasons that several studies have denied the view that 
larger board size increases the performance (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Bhagat 
and Black, 1996; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). We did not analyze the results in relation 
with this aspect; however, it may compromise performance 
 Further, findings in tables 1-4 in this dissertation suggest that there is a possibility of 
an inverted U shaped relationship between the board size and the performance of 
the firm in terms of both logged operating profit and profit before tax. This indicated 
that the performance of firm will better with increase in board size up to a certain limit 
after which, it will start depleting. This result is supported by a third and different view 
of authors that state that the size of board needs to be optimum and both smaller 
and larger board sizes may compromise performance. These authors believe that 
the relationship between the board size and performance is an inverted U shaped 
curve, such that both, very small and very large, board sizes compromise the 
performance. These categories of researchers believe that there is a positive 
relationship between board size and performance; however, it turns negative if the 
size of the board goes on either side of an optimal level (Vafeas, 1999 and Goilden 
and Zajac, 2001). Our multivariate regression analysis also suggests similar results.  
The proposal seems to be very sensible since a very small board may not have 
enough strength to think on different issues and take appropriate decision, which 
would be liked by mass and would add to the performance of the firm. On the 
reverse, we have already discussed the possible issues, which could arise given a 
larger sized board. Therefore, it becomes very important to figure out the size of the 
board adequate to have enough power to take important decisions without 
compromising with basic needs and overall performance.  Yet, finding that turning 
point is not so easy and it will take further research work and analysis to exactly find 
out the probable characteristic of the U-shape relation between the board size and 
the performance of the firm so that the point of turn may be calculated. One may try 
for hit and trial method to find the exact point of the board size that will provide 
optimal performance.  
Some previous reports have also put forward similar observation that there was no 
link between the size of the board and the performance of the firm (Hermalin and 
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Weibasch, 1991; Fosberg , 1989 and Klein ,1996).  However, the findings across 
different studies from time to time are not unequivocal and, positive, negative and no 
effects have been reported across studies. Hermalin and Weibasch, (1998) argued 
that larger board size enhances performance. The authors explained this on the 
basis that a larger board size would bring in knowledge and different expertise from 
diverse backgrounds, thus improving the performance of the company. It was 
emphasized that larger board has the capability to make better and cautious 
decisions since their reputation is in jeopardy and the losses incurred due to any 
mistakes made by them are much higher than personal benefits. Supporting the 
same view, Goilden and Zajac, (2001) stated that small board lacks the skill to 
identify problems, understand and make changes, thereby compromising the 
performance. Some others also supported that larger board size leads to a positive 
impact on performance (Shivdasani, 1993; Byrd and Hickman, 1992). However, the 
definition of the large board size remains unidentified. It is not enough to just say that 
larger board results in better performance and the analysis taking into account the 
size of the board with quantitative analysis is required to really understand if the term 
larger means the really meaningful large size. Our results though indicated some 
quantitative relationship between the size of the board and performance, however, it 
did not take the optimum size of the board into account and doing this analysis we 
cannot comment on the optimum size of the board.  
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5.3. Does the number of non-executive directors affect the performance? 
Apart from the total number of the members on the board of directors, the type of 
members on the board is also important. The researcher in the present study 
compared the data on impact of the number of non executive directors on 
performance of a firm. To study the significance of the number of non executive 
directors, the researcher has introduced the percentage of non executive directors 
as an independent variable.  
We would like to discuss the observations for the two year side by side. If we look at 
the p values obtained in case of operating profit (Table 1 and 3), the two financial 
years show inconsistent results. In the year, 2006-2007, it seems that the 
percentage of the non-executive directors was marginally linked with performance of 
the firm. In the next financial year, the p value for non-executive directors was not 
statistically significant. However, a fine look at the two p values leads us to a 
different conclusion. Though there was a very significant difference between the p 
values for the two years, the significance of the association in the year 2006-2007 
was not very strong (p = 0.038). If we take more stringent analysis of this data at 
99% level of significance, results become more consistent for both the years. The 
numbers of the non executive directors in both the financial years become non-
significant at this level of significance. It can therefore be concluded that the 
percentage of the non executive directors on board may not have a highly significant 
impact on the performance of a firm if we take into account the operating profit of the 
company. Yet, when we take the squared terms of % of members and analyze them 
with regression on performance of the firm, we find out a relatively significant 
relation. This further show that the probable relation between the board size 
comprised of both non-executive and executive directors and the performance of the 
firm is a inverted U shape relation, that is, the performance improve for a certain size 
of the board with executive and non-executive members and then it starts depleting.  
Since the analysis has been taken up both on operating profit and profit before tax, it 
becomes interesting to see if the profit before tax had any impact of the 
performance. The observations upon this analysis were interesting and different from 
the above. A strong association of the percent of non executive directors was found 
in both the financial years (Table 2 and 4). The p values were significant not only at 
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95% level of confidence but also at 99% level of confidence. The analysis states not 
only that the role of non executive directors cannot be denied but also that their 
number significantly impacts the performance.  
The significance of the number of non executive directors is also evident from the R 
square values in Tables 1-4. In the tables showing calculation using operating profit 
for the two financial years, the R square values are very small (0.160 in the year 
2006-07 and 0.083 in the year 2007-08) indicating that the number of non-executive 
directors is not a good predictor of the performance of the firm. However, in the other 
case where the calculations are done using profit before tax, the R square values are 
very good (0.804 in the year 2006-07 and 0.610 in the year 2007-08), indicating that 
the percentage of non executive directors could be a good predictor of the 
performance. It is clear from the above observations that the number of non 
executive directors is an important issue, which needs consideration during the 
constitution of the board. The board of directors, especially the non-executive 
directors are the epicenter of research carried out today for better governance 
reforms. The main duty of the non-executive directors is to monitor the management 
and to resolve the manager shareholder conflict. Thus, the non-executive directors 
form a pivotal factor of the board composition. Based on this, the researcher found 
the hypothesis that increase in the number of non executive directors' increases 
performance to be true. This is sensible since non executive directors align the 
interests of the shareholders, use their expertise for objective decision making and 
control any self interest opportunistic behavior of the management (Sullivan, 2000). 
The reformation of these operations in a firm would thus enhance the profit of the 
company.  
As mentioned earlier, the non-executive directors will de-motivate the managers from 
diversifying the firm beyond an optimum level for their own personal incentives and 
thus decreasing the shareholder value. This in turn will make the management very 
cautious and limit any opportunism existing. In addition, the outside directors reward 
the management based on their performance (i.e. the reward is based on the 
specific level of performance of the company). This makes the management closely 
link their interests in raising stock prices. This further aligns the interests between the 
management and the shareholders (Baysinger and Hossikon, 1990). Since non 
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executive directors are professionals and excel in their field of knowledge, they can 
help in making the right decision for the firm and restrict the management if it acts in 
their own self-interest (Cadbury, 1992). It is recommended to have a certain 
minimum number of outside directors on the board, and these members should play 
an active role in the areas of conflict within the firm which are likely to rise (Cadbury, 
1992).  
A large proportion of empirical research and findings have attempted to evaluate the 
contribution of non-executive directors to a firm. However, the literature is not all 
supportive on this issue. There are several previous studies, which support the view 
that the number of non-executive directors is important. Pettigrew and McNulty 
(1995) in a study on 200 UK companies (both industrial and commercial and 50 
financial institutions) concluded that the number of non executive directors is 
important but the actual power and influence depends on a set of simultaneous and 
interrelated effects of structural factors, position, expertise and willingness to 
transform potential power into actual influence. Similarly, Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) through their findings suggested that number of non-executive directors have 
a positive but a delayed impact on the financial performance of the firm. Supporting 
the same, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) found that companies would replace the 
executive directors by a number of non- executive directors after a sequence of poor 
performance.  
However, negative relation between the numbers of non executive directors and 
performance has also been reported. It has been stated that although the non-
executive directors bring different expertise and a vast source of knowledge, it is 
very difficult to convert this to value for the organization. Sometimes the impact of 
non-executive directors is negative since the company gives them no importance 
and counts them under the level of the board. This was supported by the findings of 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989). There were another set of researchers stating there was 
no link between the size of the board and the performance of the company. Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991), Fosberg (1989) and Klein (1996) all fail to confirm any relation 
between the composition of the board and performance.  Thus, according to the 
findings in our study, and the findings supporting the same in the existing literature, it 
would be right to say that the number of non-executive directors significantly affect 
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the performance. Hence our hypothesis that, larger the number of non-executive 
directors greater the performance of the company holds true. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
The researcher in this chapter has discussed and analyzed the findings and results 
obtained in Chapter 4.  These discussions and findings are supported with the 
existing literature and possible explanations. In the following chapter, the researcher 
would like to draw upon a conclusion and acknowledge the limitations that could be 
drawn from this work.     
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Chapter 6: Conclusion, Limitations and possible Suggestions  
6.1. Conclusion: 
At the end of this research work, the author has tested both the hypothesis and 
drawn appropriate conclusions. The hypotheses were tested on 2 financial years and 
the outcome across the two was compared to make final conclusions.  
Larger Board size is not the key to improved performance: The hypothesis that 
increased board size positively affects the performance was found to be false. We 
took into account the actual numbers of the members on the board to evaluate the 
effect of the board size and observed across the Tables 1-4 that the increase 
resulted in small change in performance on positive or negative size but it never 
reached statistical significance. No evidence of a positive or negative impact of the 
total number of directors on the board was found irrespective of testing the 
hypothesis on the operating profit or profit before tax. The p values were not even 
near the significance level, thereby denying any possibility of a minor effect. As 
discussed above, there could be several possible reasons why increase the board 
size did not increase the performance; however, each factor remains a possibility 
unless tested in a well planned study. 
More number of non executive directors improves performance:  The second 
hypotheses that increase in the number of non executive directors in the board 
increases the performance, was found to hold true. It was observed that the 
hypothesis when tested on operating profit of the company was found not to be true 
at 99% level of significance; however, little significance was seen at 95% level in 
financial year 2006-07. However, when the hypothesis was tested on profit before 
tax, it was found to be significantly true in both the financial years. The number of 
non-executive members had so significant impact that the hypothesis was found to 
be true both at 95% and 99% level of significance. Therefore, it is clear that the more 
the numbers of non executive directors in the board, better is the performance of the 
firm. There could be several possible reasons why more number of non executive 
directors should improve the performance and some of these have been discussed 
in the chapter above.  
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Relation between the board size and the performance is probably an inverted 
U-shaped relation: the third hypothesis that there is an inverted U-shaped relation 
between board size and the performance of the firm is seen possible. It has been 
analyzed that the hypothesis when checked on operating profits of the company 
were at much greater significance than the case of linear relations. The 95% 
significant level shown between the squared terms of board size and when 
regressed on logged values of operating profits and  profits before taxes suggests 
that there is a probable U-shaped relation between the independent variables Board 
Size and the dependent variable performance of the firm when measured in logged 
profit of the company. The result suggests that up to a certain limit, the increase in 
board size by non-executive director or an executive director will help to improve the 
performance of the company, yet after certain limit, the performance of the company 
will deplete either with increase of board size by any new executive or non-executive 
member of the board. The result seems to be quite likely as mentioned above and it 
agrees with some significant previous research works. Thus, the second and third 
hypothesizes holds truth.  
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6.2 Limitations  
The researcher can figure out several limitations in the study of the impact of the 
total number of directors and the number of non executive directors on board and its 
effect on the performance of the firm. Some of these limitations may be beyond the 
scope of this study while the others may be within the domain of the study but could 
not be eliminated due to unavoidable reasons. The researcher accepts these 
limitations and possible explanation for the same are as follows: 
 Sample Size: As stated earlier, the researcher has selected a sample size of 40 
FTSE 100 UK companies. This stands as a main limitation for this work and hence 
the findings cannot be generalized and further study is encouraged to test the 
efficacy of these results.  
Sample Heterogeneity: The selected sample companies in this work are from 
different industries such as retail industry, distribution sector, telecommunications, 
banking sectors and so on. All these industries face different issues, and go through 
different processes and have different needs for which their performance could be 
affected. The researcher however has not taken into account these differences in 
processes, issues and needs in these selected diverse companies, which could have 
affected the outcome. Therefore, better studies can be planned which take into 
account the data for one sector at a time such that the conclusions are applicable to 
that sector. 
Size of sample companies: The researcher has not taken into consideration the 
size of the companies selected. This could have biased the results such that the 
actual effect could be altered. A small sized company may have different issues to 
be discussed in comparison to a big sized company. Similarly the relative importance 
of different issues could vary between small and large companies. The researcher 
could have missed the impact of the size of the company on the size of the board 
and hence overall performance. Further studies on similar sized company of the 
same sector could be planned to test the same hypotheses with more confidence.  
Lack of consideration of behavioral dynamics in and around the board room: 
Having used quantitative data for this work, the researcher could not account for the 
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attitudes, beliefs, power, culture and influence around the board room. In addition to 
the needs and feasibilities, these factors could have affected the overall decision a 
board takes. It is possible that the impact of these factors could have entirely 
modified the outcome of this study. This could be done with the help of qualitative 
interviews, which was not possible in the present study as it was done on secondary 
data due to the limited time for the work and geographical location of the researcher. 
However, the researcher would like to invite further research in terms of the 
qualitative research and then compare it to the quantitative findings. 
Non consideration of managerial ownership:  The researcher could not account 
for any bifurcation in the ownership of equity among managers. This could 
moderately affect the performance of the firm. However, very few companies 
bifurcate the block holdings in different parties due to which the researcher could not 
account for this element. This would have introduced further heterogeneity in the 
analysis since some companies may do bifurcation and some others may not. 
However, the impact of bifurcation, if any, remains to be studied.  
No account of board sizes: The researcher has not taken into account the board 
size for each company. Different companies may have board with different sizes 
according to the need and number of meetings. The researcher however, could not 
take this factor into account due to limited sample size (N = 40 companies). This was 
feasible in such a study; however, the researcher ignored this factor because it was 
not practically possible. In case the researcher would have classified the companies 
according to the board sizes, it would have introduced further complexity in the 
analysis and sample size for each board size would have further gone down. A 
possible solution to this could be to increase the sample size (the number of 
companies), however, due to limitation of time the researcher could not get data for 
more number of companies. This could have missed an important element of the 
study and therefore, further studies taking into account the number of directors are 
encouraged.  
How big or small? Mentioning that increase in the board size increases the 
performance of the firm is not sufficient. Another important question is how small or 
big the board should be to have optimum or the best performance. It is not only the 
increase or decrease in the size of the board, which matters but also the actual 
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number of directors in the board. Similarly, it is not enough to say that increase in the 
number of non executive directors have positive impact on performance. It is equally 
important to take into account the actual number of non executive directors that the 
board should consist. The researcher could not take this into account since only 
limited information on board composition was available. It is also important how the 
size of the board or the number of the non executive directors vary with size of the 
company. It is possible that we are taking into account the data for a small company 
with big board and a big company with small board. First hand information from the 
company on board size and composition may be helpful in doing such analysis to 
find out the turning point of the probable U-shaped relationship between the board 
size and the performance of the company so that the exact size of board of directors 
to provide optimal performance can be calculated. 
Board heterogeneity: Though this study did not aim at evaluating the impact of the 
board heterogeneity on performance, still it is possible that the two factors tested 
could have been affected by overall heterogeneity of the board. It was not possible 
for the researcher to really find out the composition of the board with minute details, 
therefore, the impact of heterogeneity on the overall size and number of non 
executive directors and performance could not be taken into account. It is possible to 
make the analysis even better by taking into account the heterogeneity of the board. 
Therefore, studies with more extensive analysis of not only the size but also the 
composition of the board are encouraged.  
Contribution of directors: The researcher is of the opinion that if the data on the 
contributions of the non executive directors could be available, it would have helped 
the researcher to do a better analysis to figure out the real impact of each selected 
variable. However, this was not possible without getting into the work environment of 
the firm or taking personal qualitative and quantitative interviews. Further 
researchers, if have choice should consider getting such data for more powerful 
studies.   
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6.3. Implications  
Through this work, the researcher would like to contribute certain recommendations 
to existing theory and the managers. In the opinion of the researcher, it is not 
enough to compare the total size of the board or the total numbers of the non 
executive directors on the board. Such an analysis should take several other factors 
such as board composition, size of the board and size of the company, nature of the 
firm into account to really understand the impact of any one or two factors on the 
overall performance of the firm. The study though has provided some valuable 
insights on the impact of the size of the board and the number of non executive 
directors. It has been significantly shown that there is a probable inverted U-shaped 
relation between board size and the performance of the company, that is why the 
performance of the company improves with increase in number of executive or non-
executive members of board to a limit and than it decreases and shows negative 
trends. Due consideration to other factors as mentioned above is required to be 
given to understand the dynamics within the board which may affect the overall 
performance of the firm.  
Simultaneous, consideration of several factors seems wiser since no factor operates 
in isolation and the performance is a balanced outcome reflecting the influence of 
every possible factor that may affect the performance. Therefore, a number of 
factors should be kept in mind in designing further studies and if the impact of the 
number of the directors and the number of the non executive directors still holds 
importance and they again show a inverted U-shaped relation with the performance 
of the firm, due consideration should be given to the total size of the board along with 
heterogeneity with cautious selection of the numbers of executives and non 
executives.  
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Appendix 1 
Column 1 Column2 
Website Company Name 
www.matthey.com Johnson Matthey 
www.cadbury.com Cadbury Schweppes 
www.cairn-energy.plc.uk Cairn Energy Plc 
www.centrica.com Centrica plc 
www.ighplc.com Intercontinental Hotels 
www.aviva.com Aviva Plc 
www.cobham.com Cobham 
www.admiralgroup.co.uk Admiral Plc 
www.hammerson.com Hammerson 
www.barclays.com Barclays bank plc 
www.bunzl.com Bunzl 
www.kingfisher.co.uk Kingfisher 
www.landsecurities.co.uk Landsecurities 
www.amec.com Amec 
www.cw.com Cable and Wireless 
www.capita.co.uk Capita 
www.sky.com British sky 
www.icap.com ICAP 
www.alliancetrust.co.uk Alliance Trust Plc 
www.enrc.com ENRC 
www.baesystems.com BAE 
www.bt.com BT 
www.kazakhmys.com Kazakhmys 
www.bhpbilliton.com BHP Billiton 
www.gsk.com Glaxosmithkline 
www.balfourbeatty.com Balfour Beatty 
Antofagasta.co.uk Antofagasta Plc 
www.experiangroup.com Experian  
www.angloamerican.co.uk Anglo American 
www.ipplc.com International Power 
www.invensys.com Invensys 
www.imperial 
tobacco.com Imperial Tobacco 
www.bp.com BP 
www.britishland.com British Land 
www.autonomy.com 
Autonomy Corporation 
Plc 
http://ba.com British Airways 
www.bat.com 
British American 
Tobacco 
www.compass-group.com Compass Group Plc 
www.diageo.com Diageo 
www.inmarsat.com Inmarsat 
